This page answers the most common questions about the extremist lists of Belarus — the Republican list of extremist materials, the list of extremist formations, the Interior Ministry list of individuals and the KGB list of individuals involved in terrorist activity — plus the Russian Interior Ministry wanted database of Belarusians (per Mediazona), and about this search site: what the lists are, how to check a channel, handle or name, what the penalties are, and what data the site stores. As of 18.10.2026 the database holds 6 155 material entries, 377 formations, 6 904 individuals and 6 833 Belarusians wanted in Russia; materials, individuals and the wanted database refresh twice a day, formations once a day.
Key facts
| Entries | 6 155 (as of 18.10.2026) |
|---|---|
| Extremist formations (Interior Ministry / KGB) | 377 (as of 18.10.2026), checked once a day |
| Individuals on the Interior Ministry list | 6 904 (as of 18.10.2026), checked twice a day |
| Belarusians in the Russian Interior Ministry wanted database (per Mediazona) | 6 833 (Mediazona data of 17.10.2026), checked twice a day |
| Updates | automatic, twice a day |
| Source | official publication of the Republican list of extremist materials; the lists of extremist formations and individuals — Interior Ministry website; the RF wanted database of Belarusians — Mediazona Belarus’s daily extract |
| Search | entirely in the browser; Cyrillic ↔ Latin, 1–2 letter typos in words of 5+ letters |
| User data | none collected: no queries, no cookies, no analytics |
| Offline | yes, PWA — the database stays in the browser |
| Price | free, no sign-up |
| Code | open source, GitHub |
Materials list: entries by year of the court decision
| 2026 | 1193 entries |
|---|---|
| 2025 | 1384 entries |
| 2024 | 1462 entries |
| 2023 | 889 entries |
| 2022 | 639 entries |
| 2021 | 427 entries |
What is the Republican list of extremist materials of Belarus?
The Republican list of extremist materials is the official register of texts, videos, channels, websites, accounts, books and symbols that Belarusian courts have ruled extremist. As of 18.10.2026 it contains 6 155 entries. Each entry follows a decision by a specific court and carries the material type, its description, the court name and the decision date. Distribution (repost, forwarding, publishing), production, storage and transport of listed materials is an administrative offence under Art. 19.11 of the Administrative Code: a fine of up to 20 base units or arrest for individuals, up to 100 base units for sole traders and up to 500 for organisations. The database also holds 377 entries from the Interior Ministry / KGB list of “extremist formations” (checked once a day). The third list is the Interior Ministry list of individuals “involved in extremist activity”: 6 904 people with a conviction (occasionally another court decision) under “extremism” articles of the Criminal Code (checked twice a day). The fourth, unofficial list is Belarusians on the Russian Interior Ministry wanted list, per Mediazona Belarus’s daily extract: 6 833 people wanted (Mediazona data of 17.10.2026).
How do I check whether my Telegram channel, handle, website or I myself am on the list?
Type the handle, channel name, link, title, or a first name and surname (Cyrillic or Latin, as in a passport) into the search box on the front page — results appear instantly, in milliseconds, across all lists at once (entries from the materials list carry a red left border and “Material” label, formations a purple left border and “Formation” label, persons a teal left border and “Person” label with the date of birth “b.” to tell namesakes apart, and the RF wanted database an amber left border and “RF wanted” label with the year of birth). Search ignores case, “ё/е”, Latin vs Cyrillic “i” and quote styles; a leading “https://”, “www.” or “@” and a trailing “/” are dropped from the query, and matching is by substring — a short query like “nick” also finds “@nick”, “t.me/nick” and “nick.by”. Cyrillic and Latin are matched both ways (transliteration). When there is no exact match, the site shows words with typos: one letter for 5–7-letter words, two from 8 letters (shorter words match exactly only).
How many entries are on the list and how often is it updated?
As of 18.10.2026 the database holds 6 155 entries of the list of extremist materials, 377 entries of the list of extremist formations, 6 904 entries of the list of individuals and 6 833 Belarusians in the RF wanted database (per Mediazona). The materials list, the persons list and the RF wanted database refresh automatically twice a day: the sources are checked in the morning and in the evening, and new entries reach the site a few minutes after each check; the formations list is checked once a day. 99.8% of the materials list entries are “information products” (channels, websites, accounts, videos, chats); the rest are printed editions, books, symbols and paraphernalia.
What is the list of individuals involved in extremist activity?
The list of citizens of Belarus, foreign nationals and stateless persons “involved in extremist activity” is kept by the Interior Ministry and published as several .doc files on its website (6 904 people as of 18.10.2026). The persons list usually holds people with a final conviction under “extremism” articles of the Criminal Code (most often 342, 130, 368, 369, 361-x); occasionally people whose case a court closed on non-rehabilitating grounds or who were sent for compulsory treatment. Under the Law on Countering Extremism, listing brings restrictions — in particular on teaching, publishing, state and military service and owning weapons — until the conviction is expunged or lifted and for five more years; a person is removed five years after expungement, if the verdict is quashed, or on death. Each entry carries the surname, first name and patronymic, a Latin transliteration, citizenship, date of birth, the grounds (court and articles of the verdict), the date of inclusion and location. The site shows these entries with a teal left border and “Person” label, lets you search by name in Cyrillic or Latin, and the dates of birth (“b.”) help tell namesakes apart. The reference note from the list (“serving the sentence”, “conviction not expunged”) is not shown: the Interior Ministry does not update it in parts it has already published, so in older entries it is often out of date. Instead, the record page links to the very .doc part of the list that currently contains the person, so you can check the primary source.
What is the RF wanted database of Belarusians and where does the data come from?
It is not an official Belarusian list but an extract from the Russian Interior Ministry wanted database: citizens and natives of Belarus whom Russia has put on its wanted list. The Russian database itself offers only a captcha-protected search by name and does not respond from abroad, so the data comes from Mediazona Belarus’s daily extract, which it publishes openly (6 833 people wanted as of 17.10.2026); the site checks this extract twice a day and shows the date of its file in the header. Belarusians end up on the Russian wanted list at the request of Belarusian agencies (the Interior Ministry, the State Control Committee, the KGB): the person is sought both in Belarus and in Russia, and can be detained and extradited in Russia and in countries that cooperate with it (in particular the CIS and CSTO). The database does not state the article. Removal from the database does not mean the criminal prosecution has ended, and absence from it does not mean there is no criminal case in Belarus. Each entry carries the surname, first name and patronymic (as in the database, in Russian), the year of birth, nationality, the Belarusian agency that requested the search and its region, the date the search was announced (approximate, “before …”, for some entries), other spellings of the name and a mark when the person has been removed from the database. The site shows these entries with an amber left border and “RF wanted” label, and when the same person (same name and year of birth) is also on the Interior Ministry persons list, the two cards link to each other.
What is the KGB list of individuals involved in terrorist activity, and how is it shown on the site?
It is the official “List of organisations and individuals involved in terrorist activity” kept by the KGB: individuals and organisations with decisions of Belarusian courts and the KGB, alongside foreigners and organisations from UN sanctions lists (the site does not show those); as of 16.10.2026 it holds 740 people in Belarusian cases. The KGB list holds people convicted under “terrorism” and related articles of the Criminal Code (289, 290-1–290-5, 293, 295, 359, as well as 130 and 361) and people merely charged under them — before any trial, often in absentia. Banks and other financial institutions must freeze the assets and block the transactions of listed persons, and giving such a person money or property may count as financing terrorist activity (Art. 290-1 CC). The list publishes no dates of inclusion or removal. Most of these people are also on the Interior Ministry list of individuals, so on the site the KGB list is not a separate list: its people appear in the same “Persons” list. Those on both lists appear as a single Interior Ministry card with a crimson “terrorist · KGB” label and the KGB list fields on the entry page; those not on the Interior Ministry list appear as their own card with a crimson left border and “Terrorist · KGB” label. The word “terrorist” in the search finds them all. Each entry carries the surname, first name and patronymic, a transliteration, citizenship, date of birth, address, the grounds (a verdict or charges with Criminal Code articles) and the number in the list; the list publishes no inclusion dates, so the site shows the version of the list in which the entry appeared. The official list page on the KGB website often does not respond from abroad; the KGB publishes updates as a file in its Telegram channel, and the site takes them from there.
What are the penalties for reposting or storing a listed material?
Distribution (repost, forwarding, publishing), production, storage and transport of listed materials is an administrative offence under Art. 19.11 of the Administrative Code: a fine of up to 20 base units or arrest for individuals, up to 100 base units for sole traders and up to 500 for organisations. In practice an old repost, a saved file, a sticker or a link in a chat has been enough for a charge. This is not legal advice: for a real problem, contact human rights defenders.
Is merely subscribing to a listed channel an offence?
Merely subscribing to a listed channel is not named as an offence in the law, but during phone checks subscriptions and saved materials are treated as “storage” and grounds for questioning. Before travelling to Belarus, rights defenders advise unsubscribing, deleting chats, files and caches — ideally not carrying a device with such history at all.
How does the list of extremist materials differ from the list of extremist formations, the list of individuals and the RF wanted database?
They are four different lists, and the site searches all of them at once. The list of “extremist materials” is formed by courts (red left border and “Material” label) and carries administrative liability. The list of “extremist formations” is maintained by the Interior Ministry and the KGB (377 entries, checked once a day); such results carry a purple left border and “Formation” label. Participation in an “extremist formation”, assistance, donations or passing information to one is a criminal offence (Criminal Code Art. 361-1 participation, 361-2 financing, 361-4 assistance). The list of individuals “involved in extremist activity” is kept by the Interior Ministry (6 904 people, checked twice a day): people with a conviction or another court decision under “extremism” articles, marked with a teal left border and “Person” label. The list of individuals “involved in terrorist activity” is kept by the KGB (740 people in Belarusian cases): on the site it is not a separate list but part of the persons list — such people carry a crimson “terrorist · KGB” label. The Russian Interior Ministry wanted database of Belarusians (6 833 people, Mediazona’s extract is updated daily) is not an official Belarusian list: people get there at the request of Belarusian agencies; such entries carry an amber left border and “RF wanted” label. The tabs under the search box — “All · Materials · Formations · Persons · RF wanted” — show how many matches each list has and limit the results to one list. Many resources and people appear on several lists at once.
Is this site safe to use?
The site collects no data: no queries, no cookies, no analytics. The site itself keeps no logs; the hosting (GitHub Pages), like any server, sees the IP address and the page address but not search queries — they never enter the address bar and run entirely in your browser, because the whole database is downloaded to the device. The watchlist and its settings (notifications, whether the panel is open), theme, language and sort order live only in this device’s localStorage, the once-per-session confirmation for opening links in sessionStorage, and “Clear everything” deletes all of it together with the offline copy of the database in one click. Do that before travelling to Belarus or crossing the border, and clear your browser history. Links inside entries lead to the listed resources themselves — the site warns you before opening. Opening the official list sites and files directly, or using the official search, can be risky in itself: visitor data may be collected by Belarusian authorities.
How do I find out when something new is added to the list?
The “What’s new” tab shows everything added to all four lists in the last 30 days (with list filters and a toggle for removed entries). To avoid checking by hand there are three ways. Watchlist: type your handle or channel and press “Watch” — every time you open the site it re-checks all such queries and shows at the top whether anything new appeared, with optional browser notifications. The RSS feed feed.xml works in any feed reader (one shared feed of new entries; for your own keywords use the watchlist). The Telegram channel @elist_by posts a digest after every update.
Is this an official site?
No. The site is unofficial and independent, with open source code on GitHub. Data is pulled automatically from the official publications — the Republican list of extremist materials (Ministry of Information), the list of extremist formations and the list of individuals (Interior Ministry) — and is never edited: entry text, grounds and dates are kept exactly as in the source. The RF wanted database of Belarusians is unofficial too: it is Mediazona Belarus’s daily extract from the Russian Interior Ministry database. For legally significant decisions, verify against the official publication, bearing in mind that official sites may collect visitor data.
What should I do if I find myself or my resource on the list?
Check the entry text, the date and the grounds — the court name for materials, the Interior Ministry / KGB decision for formations, the verdict and the date of birth for a person, the year of birth and the requesting agency for an RF wanted entry (the lists have many namesakes): they define what was ruled extremist and when. For a formation the liability is criminal, so seek advice right away. If you are in the RF wanted database, you can be detained and extradited not only in Russia but also in countries that cooperate with it — consult rights defenders before travelling. Add the query to your watchlist to see when a related entry appears. Consult human rights defenders about your risks and possible appeal: Viasna Human Rights Centre and Human Constanta.
Does the search work offline?
Yes. The site is a PWA: after the first visit the app shell and a copy of the database stay in the browser, and search keeps working offline. It can be “installed” on a phone like an app. When you are offline, the header shows the date of the saved database copy.
Can I run my own mirror of the site?
Yes. The site is static: `npm run build` produces a dist/ folder you can host anywhere — GitHub Pages, Netlify, Cloudflare Pages, your own server or IPFS. Set BASE_PATH (the path the site is served from) and SITE_URL (the full address) so links resolve correctly. Code and instructions are in the GitHub repository.